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PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
THE NAME OF THE MARRIED WOMAN

Louisiana does not have legislation on the name of the married woman. Now the Supreme Court, following the general
American opinion expressed in Corpus Juris Secundum, has
declared that the married woman's name should be that of her
first name and her husband's family name, that she might use
her own family name as a "middle name" if she pleases, and
that "social custom" permits her to use her husband's first and
family names prefixed by "Mrs."'2 The decision goes beyond
this, however, for in effect it announces that a married woman
may be enjoined from using the traditional and usual, socially
acceptable, form of address, if this is likely to inconvenience or
mislead others. Here the problem was one of possible confusion
of names on a ballot, both husband and wife being candidates
for the same office. The tradition of the civil law, heretofore
recognized in Louisiana practice and doctrine, is that a woman's
legal name does not change on marriage. Justice Sanders, with
whom Justice Summers concurred, pointed this out in his dissenting opinion.3
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Verbo "names" §§ 1 3, 4.
2. Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Committee, 245 La. 145,
157 So. 2d 718 (1963), reversing 156 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
3. 245 La. at 171, 157 So. 2d at 727.
[291]

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

MARRIAGE4

The opinion of Judge Tate in Chivers v. Couch Motor Lines,
Inc. 5 affirms the previous jurisprudence to the effect that a
common law (consensual, non-ceremonial) marriage contracted
in a jurisdiction where such form of celebration is recognized
is to be considered valid in Louisiana. Indeed, the accepted conflict of laws rule is that the state in which the marriage is celebrated has legislative competence to prescribe the form of the
ceremony. Moreover, the failure to recognize a marriage contracted in a form authorized by a sister-state's laws would be to
deny that state's laws full faith and credit. The opinion in the
case also contains a splendid review of the Florida law on common law marriages.
SEPARATION AND DIVORCE

6

For years our jurisprudence had been to the effect that it
is cruel treatment warranting separation from bed and board
for one not to provide his wife with a home separate from that
of his family, if he could do so, when the latter are hostile or unfriendly to her. Then in 1939 Cormier v. Cormier7 extended this
idea to require the husband to provide a home "sufficiently remote from the house of his family so as to remove whatever hostile or unkind influences that this proximity might cause" when
'(1) it was proved that his family was hostile or unfriendly and
likely to cause a disruption in their home and (2) the husband
could in fact provide a separate home. Now Doucet
v. Doucet,8
misconstruing the Cormier case, affirms "there is a presumption
of hostile atmosphere where the families live proximately" and
4. Melancon v. Sonnier, 157 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) applied acbepted jurisprudentially determined rules on proof of bad faith in putative marriagea and on proof of the fact of marriage itself.
5. 159 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
6. Separation and divorce decisions not requiring special comment herein are:
Breaux v. Breaux, 161 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) applying the usual
rule that mutual fault deprives both parties of cause for separation; Mason v.

Mason, 155 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) affirming that husband's leaving
the common dwelling by mutual agreement does not constitute abandonment;
Walker v. Walker, 159 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) applying the rule
that he who alleges reconciliation must prove it; Antony v. Antony, 160 So. 2dl
765 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) applying accepted rules on proof of adultery;

LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 162 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) affirming previous
decisions on the effect of perjured testimony on a judgment of divorce or separation; and Lesnack v. Lesnack, 156 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) refusing
to give effect to a :default judgment rendered in the wife's suit for divorce after
her suit and the husband's had been consolidated.

7. 193 La. 158, 190 So. 365 (1939).
8. 158 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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'his failure" to provide a separate or remote home, where he
can, "is presumed to constitute cruel treatment." Thus the plaintiff was not required to prove actual hostility on the part of her
husband's family, only the nearness of their residences. It' is re,
grettable that the husband did not seek a review of this decision;
so that the Supreme Court might have had an opportunity to
expunge the appellate court's decision, for certainly it extends
the notion of cruelty too far. Indeed, if followed literally, every
husband able to do so would have to provide a home distant from
his family's or be subject to a presumption of cruel treatment
toward his wife.
It used to be that the cause for which a divorce was granted,
and to whom it was granted, would make a great deal of difference for the subsequent rights of the parties. Thus under article 161 of the Civil Code the party divorced for adultery even
now cannot marry his accomplice; under article 157 the, party
obtaining the divorce (for cause in the nature of fault on the
part of the other spouse) is entitled to the custody of the children, unless their welfare demands it be given to the other; and,
before the amendment of article 160 in 1964, 9 alimony rights frequently depended on who won the race to court. Now the wife'
at fault cannot demand alimony in any case under the amended
article 160. The Supreme Court has for years construed article
157 to permit application of the presumption that it is better for
young children and girls to be placed in the custody of their
mothers, and occasionally the legislature will ratify marriages
contracted in contravention of article 161. But it is still true
that a spouse divorced for adultery may not marry his accomplice, and in this context two decisions are especially interesting.
In Jones v. Floyd,10 decided by the Court of Appeal for the Third
Circuit, a wife who had obtained a separation on the ground of
abandonment filed a reconventional demand for divorce on the
ground of adultery, when her husband sought a divorce on the
ground of non-reconciliation. In McCaa v. McCaa,11 decided by
the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, the wife filed a reconventional demand for divorce on the ground of living separate and apart for more than two years when her husband filed
suit for divorce on the ground of adultery. The court of the
9. By La. Acts 1964, No. 48. See the discussion of this amendment in Louisiana
Legislation of 1964- Persons and the Family, 25 L. L. REV. 13 (1964).
10. 154 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
11. 163 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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Third Circuit refused to grant the wife a divorce on the ground
of adultery saying that the wife had "no legally recognized interest" to defeat her husband's right to marry his paramour when
he is "entitled by law" to a divorce on another ground. On the
other hand, the Second Circuit awarded the plaintiff husband
a divorce on the ground of adultery even though the wife had
reconvened for divorce on the ground of living separate and
apart for the required time. Certainly the comparison and appraisal of the cases would be more interesting if the plaintiff's
and reconvenor's positions had been reversed in the Third Circuit's case, so that in both cases the plaintiff would have been
the party pleading adultery, and the reconvenor the party pleading separation in fact or non-reconciliation. Would the Third Circuit have given the divorce to the spouse reconvening for divorce
on the ground of separation in fact or non-reconciliation? If so,
the court clearly would have shown "odium" for article 161 (forbidding marriage of the divorced adulterer and accomplice) and
"favor" toward the laws providing the other grounds, a practice
forbidden by article 20 of the Civil Code. Probably the court
of the Third Circuit would not have done this, so we may presume that the decisions may be reconciled as grants of divorce
to plaintiffs with cause regardless of the causes alleged in reconvention. Such a reconciliation of the decisions, however, if taken
as a rule, would place a premium on the race to the divorce court,
a result to be avoided. Clearly divorce for cause and for separation in fact or non-reconciliation ought to be ranked by
legislative act to eliminate this possibility. On this ranking, the
writer would differ from the judges of the Third Circuit, preferring to grant the divorce to the party proving the adultery of
the other, precisely to prevent the latter from ever marrying his
or her accomplice. The seriousness of adultery warrants this
sanction.
ALIMONYI

2

Alimony pendente lite is, as the words imply, alimony pending the outcome of litigation, and the litigation referred to is a
12. Alimony decisions involving domestic law only and not requiring comment
herein are: Poydras v. Poydras, 155 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Dupuis

v. Patin, 155 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; McNeill v. McNeill, 156 So. 2d
307 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Wilson v. Wilson, 157 So. 2d 590

(La. App. 2d

Cir. 1963) ; Teague v. Teague, 157 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Lucas v.
Lucas, 157 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Gautreaux v. Hebert, 158 So. 2d
277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Anderson v. Anderson, 158 So. 2d 303 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963) ; and Stoltz v. Stoltz, 162 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce. Once a
decree either granting or denying divorce is final, and once that
denying separation is final, 13 the right to alimony pendente lite
ceases. Furthermore, what has been paid as alimony pendente
lite cannot be recovered by the husband even if the separation
or divorce is not granted, and under similar circumstances
amounts due but not yet paid may be demanded by the wife. All
this is clear for alimony pendente lite claimed in suits for separation or divorce filed in Louisiana. What, however, is to be
done in situations in which a wife files suit for separation or
divorce in this state and the husband proves that the parties
were already divorced (whether in Louisiana or elsewhere), at
the time of the wife's suit? Until there is a final judgment in
the suit recognizing the validity of the previous divorce the wife
clearly should be entitled to receive payment of alimony pendente
lite, for the truth of the husband's exception cannot be assumed
and must be proven. But when the validity of the previous divorce is proven, should the wife be allowed to retain all the payments made as alimony pendente lite, or should she be required
to return all amounts exceeding those to which she might be entitled as a divorced wife? This was the principal question presented in Walker v. Walker. 4 Judges Hood and Culpepper took
the first view, affirming that the wife should be entitled to
retain the amounts paid as alimony pendente lite in any case.
Judge Tate, however, suggested that on its being proven that
the parties had been divorced the wife should be obliged to return all amounts above what she may be judged entitled to as
alimony after divorce, and this on the principle of unjust enrichment. The writer agrees with this latter solution. Our legislation on alimony pendente lite certainly was not written for
application to cases of this kind. The case calls for a decision by
application of article 21 of the Civil Code, and this in effect is
what Judge Tate's opinion is.' 5
13. Under the Louisiana jurisprudence alimony pendente lite continues after a
separation judgment.
14. 157 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), writ granted, 245 La. 582, 159
So. 2d 289 (1964).
15. The same decision also implied that a divorce rendered in another state
might, if personal procedural jurisdiction were obtained over both spouses, limit
the wife's right to alimony in the future. For a discussion of this aspect of the
case see the writer's comments on the amendment to La. Civil Code article 160
by Acts 1964, No. 48, at 25 LA. L. REV. 13 (1964). Other decisions on alimony
suits following divorces in other jurisdictions, not commented on here, are Levert
v. Levert, 156 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 245 La. 98, 157
So. 2d 236 (1963), and Folds v. Folds, 160 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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There were several other alimony decisions of interest.'
Hebert v. Hebert16 serves to emphasize the inequity of the rule
that alimony payments continue to fall due even though the reason for the alimentary obligation ceases or is suspended. The
mother had been deprived of custody pending juvenile court proceedings and during this period the father had in fact supported
the child. Nevertheless, because the father had not petitioned
for a discontinuance of the alimony, the mother was given judg-:
ment for the payments falling due during the period. The rule
is not new, but few alimony obligors are aware of its existence,
and thus it becomes an instrument of injustice.
In Vedrenne v. Vedrenne1 7 the court of appeal indicated approval of the practice, which it initiated in 1962,18 of reducing
the husband's liability for alimony by the income the wife's total
assets (presumably her "means" under article 160 of the Civil
Code) would yield if converted to cash. The court did not, however, adhere to the rule strictly, but used its discretion, as is
proper, in fixing the final amount of the award. This method of
computing the "means" of the wife certainly has not yet been
fully tested, and it is difficult to state the extent of its merits
and demerits. One of its merits, however, is that it does not require the wife to consume her capital before claiming alimony,
and another is that it frankly characterizes "means" in terms
of potential income from capital assets. Nevertheless, even as
so interpreted, article 160 provides a different standard for alimony than article 148 on alimony pendente lite; for there only
actual income is taken into consideration and under article 160
both actual income from any source and the potential income
from capital are considered.
Finally, in Jefferson v. Jefferson, 9 the one Supreme Court
decision involving an alimony question, it was held that a grandparent may be sued for alimony without establishing that the
parents are unable to provide support, the legislation on alimony
between ascendants and descendants not ranking the obligations.
The writer agrees that under the legislation as it stands the
party seeking alimony need not show any factor other than need,
and that he need not sue the alimony obligors in any particular
16.
17.
18.
19.

159 So. 2d 537 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
163 So. 2d 853 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
In Roberts v. Roberts, 145 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
246 La. 1, 163 So. 2d 74 (1964).
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order or all of them collectively. It would seem proper, however,
to hope for legislation ranking alimentary obligations and permitting the relative sued to compel the joinder of all persons
obligated with him or before him so that his own obligation
might be fixed as the portion of the total amount needed by the
plaintiff and not payable by other persons.
PATERNITY

20

Burrell v. Burrell2' and Melancon v. Sonnier2 are two more
decisions in the long line of cases demonstrating the substantive
injustice worked by the Louisiana judiciary's interpretation of
the Civil Code's articles on "proof of legitimate filiation." Here
it will be sufficient to consider only the Burrell facts and decision. Three children were born to Mrs. D while living in open
concubinage with Mr. B in his home. Had Mrs. D been a single
woman, the children would have been Mr. B's by application of
Civil Code article 209, under which the children of a concubine
are those of the man in whose home she lives; but because she
was a married woman, the court, consistently with prior jurisprudence interpreting articles 184 to 212 of the Civil Code, adjudged them to be the children of Mr. D. Mrs. D had sought to
prove Mr. B was father of the children and to require him to pay
alimony for their support. Now, undoubtedly Mr. D will have
the honor of supporting the children, and treating them, of
necessity of law, as his forced heirs. Yet the difficulty does not
result so much from the legislation as from its interpretation.
Were it recognized that the presumption that the husband of the
mother is the father of her children properly has no application
when there is no basis for reputing them to be such (as in this
case, if the mother is living in another's home as his concubine)
23
then great injustice could be avoided.
ADOPTION

In re Ackenhausen24 is worthy of note for its interpretation
of R.S. 9:422.1, even if only by way of dictum. Under the stat20. Cases involving paternity questions not requiring discussion herein are
Carter v. Canal Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) and Ferguson
v. Cascio, 158 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
21. 154 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
22. 157 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
23. See the writer's observations on this matter in Who 18 the Papa, 18 LA.
L. Rav. 685 (1958).
24. 244 La. 730, 154 So. 2d 380 (1963).
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ute, a person married to a child's parent may adopt the child
without the consent of the other parent if his spouse has custody
and the other parent "has refused or failed" over the period of
a year to comply with an order for its support. Under this decision the failure or refusal must not have been "with just cause,
and therefore excusable."
MINORS AND INTERDICTS

Jefferson v. Jefferson,25 already considered in another context,26 serves to point up as unsatisfactory two rules of law con-

cerning minors. The first is that the minor may not sue his parents during paternal authority. The second is that there is no
one authorized to represent the minor if his father (or the
mother if the father is a mental incompetent or an absentee)
neglects to do so. Here the mother, acting as the child's representative, sued the father and grandparents for alimony. The
court upheld the mother's right to represent the child because
it found the father to be an absentee, 27 and gave judgment
against the grandparents. The court did not give judgment
against the father and, although it did not state its reasons, it
must be assumed that it did not do so because of the prohibition
of suit by a child against his parent in R.S. 9:571, added to our
legislation by Act 31 of 1960. Clearly under this new legislation the child cannot sue the father civilly for alimony or anything else as long as his parents are not separated from bed and
board or divorced, and the only remedies for the situation would
be to urge criminal proceedings against the father under articles
74 and 75 of the Code of Criminal Law (for the crime of criminal neglect of family) or for the mother to seek a separation
from bed and board. Neither of these actions should be encouraged if it is at all possible to avoid them, and thus the rule of
law which does encourage them must be judged undesirable.
Moreover, as there is no legislation giving the mother or anyone else the authority of an undertutor, no one can take steps
to compel the father to pursue the child's interests against third
persons. Legislation on these two points, therefore, would appear to be indicated.
In re Tutorship of La Fauci Children28 revealed two more
25.
26.
27.
28.

246 La. 1, 163 So. 2d 74 (1964).
See Alimony, p. 294 supra.
See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 683 and 4502 (1960).

156 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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legislative deficiencies. Article 39 of the Civil Code, written before the day when parents could be deprived of the custody of
their children, provides that "the domicile of a minor not emancipated is that of his father, mother, or tutor." Article 4031 of
the new Code of Civil Procedure, apparently ignoring the present practice, provides that petitions for the appointment of a
tutor shall be "in the parish where the surviving parent is domiciled." In the instant case the Juvenlie Court in Jefferson Parish had awarded custody of the children to persons domiciled
there. The mother, seeking to be confirmed as tutrix, sued in
Orleans, the parish of her domicile. The court ruled that the
children were domiciled in Jefferson Parish and that article 4031
of the Code of Civil Procedure did not "embrace" this situation,
but that under its "rationale" the suit should be initiated at the
domicile of the children.
Still a third case illustrating an unsatisfactory element in

the law of incapables is Doll v. Doll.29 The court of appeal fol-

lowed long-standing jurisprudence interpreting articles 389 and
422 of the Civil Code to mean that no one can be interdicted unless all three of the following factors are present: incapacity
to administer one's affairs, incapacity to care for one's person,
and an absolute necessity for the interdiction. The writer submits there is need for ameliorating legislation. One may be perfectly capable of caring for one's person without being capable
of administering one's affairs, and interdiction here may be as
necessary as tutorship for a teen-age child.
CUSTODY

Three custody decisions were of special interest. In both
Mouton v. St. Romain 0 and State ex rel. Rothrock v. Webberu
parents had executed authentic acts delivering custody of their
children to third persons and consenting to their being adopted
by them. In both cases the parents revoked their consent to the
proposed adoptions and sought to regain custody. The same
29. 156 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). In another appeal in the same
case, 160 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), the court ruled that although the
person successfully initiating interdiction proceedings could recover for attorney
fees, he could not recover for the fees of an associate counsel not employed by
him, and thus that such associate counsel could not recover directly from the
interdict's estate. Apparently the fee recovered by the primary counsel was in
reality for all legal services, and thus the associate counsel should have proceeded
against him.
30. 245 La. 839, 161 So. 2d 737 (1964).
31. 245 La. 901, 161 So. 2d 759 (1964).
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court of appeal, that for the Third Circuit, had returned the
child to the parent in Mouton32 and denied the return in Rothrock.83 The Supreme Court in both cases allowed the parents to
regain the custody of their children. In the third case, Brown
v. Ellison,3 4 the court of appeal returned a child to its mother
after she had placed it in the care of third persons temporarily,
until she could better care for it. Assuming the facts to be well
stated by the court of appeal, the Brown case poses no difficulty,
for parents certainly have the right to delegate to others the
care of their children. Nothing in our law requires a parent to
care personally for his child, and there is no failure of legal obligation as long as the parent sees to it that his child is cared
for properly. Such delegation does not imply either an abandonment or a transfer of custody intended to be permanent. In this
kind of situation, therefore, there should be no question of the
parent's right to regain the custody of his or her child.
The Mouton and Rothrock situations, however, pose the problem of the effect to be assigned to transfers of custody apparently intended to be permanent. Actually our written law does not
foresee any voluntary parental transfer of permanent custody
(and therefore of a portion of paternal authority) to third persons other than one to an adoption agency with a view to that
agency's placing the child for adoption. 35 Thus it may well be
asked whether any other attempt at a permanent transfer of
custody can be recognized as operative in itself. It would seem
appropriate to regard a parental attempt to give custody permanently to another as a violation of public order, as evidenced by
the framework of our law on paternal authority (including its
obligations) and supported by sound reason. But, granted this
to be so, it is also true that our written law once did, and in one
respect still does, evidence the principle that parents who abandon their children should not be entitled to regain their custo37
dy.3 6 Article 213 of the Civil Code, unfortunately now repealed,
though probably not with the view to denying this principle,
used to provide that parents could not recover a foundling from
32. Mouton v. St. Romain, 153 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
33. State ex rel. Rothrock v. Webber, 155 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963),
cert. granted, 245 La. 73, 156 So. 2d 607 (1963).
34. 162 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
35. LA. R.S. 9:402, 9:404 (1950).
36. La. Acts 1948, No. 227.
37. The writer suspects that this article was repealed by La. Acts 1948, No.
227, because of its provision permitting relatives of the child other than the parents to claim its tutorship and its custody.
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those who had taken care of it without showing they had lost
the child through "force, fraud, or accident." Today only the
juvenile court legislation evidences the notion that custody may
be taken from parents for abandonment or neglect. 38 The prin-

ciple is a sound one, nevertheless, and apparently it was this
principle, liberally construed, which was applied in both Mouton
and Rothrock; for in each case the court emphasized that the
"surrender" had been made by the parents when they were in
effect under a kind of duress from great emotional strain or financial difficulty. The same principle, too, was applied in 1955
in State ex rel. Deason v. McWilliams, 39 the Supreme Court then
denying a return of custody to parents who had surrendered
their child even though they were in every way capable of rearing it.
It may well be, however, that in some circumstances the parents should not be allowed to regain custody of their children
even though the original surrender was intended to be temporary, as a mere delegation of a portion of paternal authority, or
intended to be permanent, but made under pressure of circumstances. Such would be the case where the parents themselves
have ceased to be fit or able to provide an adequate home for the
child, or where the shift of the child from its then home to its
parents' home would almost certainly cause it serious emotional
harm. Parental right is sacred, but it is no more so than the
welfare of the child. This, after all, is the principle underlying
juvenile court legislation permitting parents to be deprived of
the right to custody after abandonment or neglect of the child.
Our written law not being sufficiently explicit in detail, much
discretion must be left to the judiciary to appreciate the facts
in terms of the principle, and here reasonable men may well differ in their appreciation of the particular circumstances.
A fourth custody decision of interest is Bush v. Bush,40 and
this for its strong statement against divided custody decrees. It
may be added, too, that divided custody would cause difficulties
in the law of tutorship, for tutorhip follows an award of cus41
tody to a parent following separation or divorce.
38. LA. R.S. 13:1570(1), 13:1580 (1950).
39. 227 La. 957, 81 So. 2d 8 (1955).
40. 163 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
41. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 250 (1870).

